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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff & : 
Appellee : 
v. : 
SONJA LE SWANSON, J 
Defendant & 
Appellant. : 
: Appellate Court No. 
: 930160-CA 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH FOUNDATION 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY 
This Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union 
of Utah Foundation, Inc. is filed pursuant to Rule 25, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, by leave of the Court and consent of 
defendant/appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Amicus Curiae will focus on the following issues: (1) The 
ruling of the trial court failed to recognize the seminal 
significance of the right to impartial and loyal counsel 
uncompromised by an actual or perceived conflict; and (2) The 
ruling of the trial court failed to recognize the existence of a 
disqualifying conflict when appointed defense counsel maintained 
an "of counsel" or office sharing relationship with law partners 
who had prosecutorial responsibilities and who made supervisory 
and funding decisions regarding the office of the county 
prosecutor and county public defender. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant, Sonja Swanson, (hereinafter "Swanson") appeals 
from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, by the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. 
On January 13, 1993, Swanson was arrested in her home 
pursuant to a search warrant. The search uncovered 
methamphetamine in her purse. At the Information hearing, the 
trial court determined that Swanson was indigent and appointed J. 
MacAurther Wright as Appellant's public defender ("Counsel"). At 
the time of his appointment, Counsel maintained and testified to 
maintaining an "of counsel" and/or office sharing relationship 
with other lawyers who had prosecutorial responsibilities in 
Washington County. Moreover, a senior attorney in counsel's 
office was and still is a Washington County Commissioner with 
supervisory and funding responsibility over the office of the 
Washington County Prosecutor and the Washington County Public 
Defender. Swanson, on the advice of her appointed Counsel 
entered into a plea agreement. Subsequent to the trial court's 
approval of the plea agreement and imposition of sentence, 
2 
Swanson sought the advice of new counsel, Clayton Huntsman. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Utah 
Foundation, Inc., adopts the facts as set forth in Appellant's 
brief filed with this court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The ruling of the trial court that Swanson1s 
representation was not compromised by the conflicts between 
Swanson's counsel and the other lawyers in his office failed to 
fully consider the importance of the Right to Counsel guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment which requires that counsel's 
representation be meaningful and effective. The right to 
effective counsel is undermined when counsel has divided loyalty 
as demonstrated or presumed based on counsel's "of counsel" or 
office sharing relationship with lawyers in his office who had 
prosecutorial responsibilities. 
II. Swanson's counsel maintained a relationship as "of 
counsel" and/or office sharing with a law firm whose partners had 
prosecutorial responsibilities in the town of Ivins, located in 
Washington County. Moreover, a senior partner in the law firm 
with whom counsel maintained his "of counsel" relationship was 
and still is a Washington County Commissioner with supervisory 
and funding responsibility over the offices of the Washington 
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County Prosecutor and Public Defender. These factors created an 
impermissible and disqualifying conflict and severely compromised 
the undivided loyalty required by The Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (1993). 
III. Utah Code § 77-32-1 provides that a county is 
responsible to assure indigent defendant's receive "undivided 
loyalty" of counsel. An award of attorney's fees to Swanson's 
current counsel is appropriate in view of Washington County's 
breach of it's responsibility to appoint effective and conflict 
free counsel for indigent defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I. S 12 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY COMPROMISED IF 
COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION IS TAINTED BY CONFLICT. 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
an accused shall have "the assistance of counsel for his 
defense." U.S. Const. Amemdment VI. The Utah Constitution 
Article I, § 12 likewise guarantees the right: "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel..." In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963), the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
importance of the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal 
proceedings. "[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not 
luxuries". Id. at 344. The adversarial system's effectiveness is 
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protected by the Sixth Amendment's requirement that the accused 
have an advocate in court. If the criminal justice system is to 
produce fair and reliable results, then partisan advocacy must be 
available to each of the parties involved. 
In Gideon, the Supreme Court specifically recognized the 
importance of appointed counsel for the indigent. "[A]ny person 
hailed into court, who is too poor to have a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id. 
Unlike those accused who can afford the most competent attorney 
to confront their accuser and prepare their defense, the indigent 
cannot receive the full protection contemplated by the Sixth 
Amendment absent governmental intercedence on their behalf. 
Those who intercede, however, owe no less a duty to the indigent 
than the attorney who commands and receives top dollar for her 
services. The criminal justice system's goal of providing equal, 
fair, and just results depends upon both sides zealously engaging 
in the adversarial process. "This noble ideal cannot be realized 
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers 
without a lawyer to assist him." Id. at 344. 
While Gideon confirmed the Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel, later Supreme Court decisions found the 
right an empty one absent effective assistance of counsel. In 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983), the Supreme Court 
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noted that counsel's presence in itself was not enough: 
[t]hat a person who happens to be a lawyer is present 
at trial alongside the accused is not enough to satisfy 
the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment 
recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel 
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to 
produce just results. An accused is entitled to be 
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, 
who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial 
is fair. 
Id. at 685. The Sixth Amendment requires affirmative assistance 
of counsel. This assistance is measured by what is reasonable 
under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688 (emphasis added). 
In other words, if a defendant presents facts which demonstrate 
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness or that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense, a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred. 
The most basic duty of counsel is to provide undivided 
loyalty to the client. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
692 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has found divided 
loyalty of counsel to be a prima facie evidence of 
ineffectiveness of counsel. Id. After the defendant shows an 
actual conflict of interest, then prejudice is presumed. 
Other state courts concur in the importance of effective 
representation untainted by conflict. In People v. Grisby, 3 65 
N.E. 2d 481 (111. App. 1st 1977), the court noted that "an 
attorney owes his client undivided allegiance, and this is 
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particularly true of an attorney representing a person accused of 
crime. Where an attorney's loyalty to a defendant in a criminal 
case is diluted by that attorney's obligation to others, the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel is not satisfied." Id. at 484. In the Grisby case the 
court held that a co-counsel who represented the complaining 
witness against the defendant in another matter was unable to 
render effective assistance of counsel. The Illinois court noted 
that in a criminal case where a defense attorney has a possible 
conflict of interest he should not participate in the defense 
even though "no actual prejudice to the defendant as a result of 
the conflict is, or can be shown." Id. According to the court 
"the significant inquiry is not whether the attorney concurrently 
represents two clients with inconsistent positions but whether a 
potential conflict of interest exists." Id. 
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held in Smith v. Whatcott, 757 
F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985), that an entire firm was disqualified 
from representing defendants due to one attorney's prior 
representation of plaintiff in a related criminal action, 
notwithstanding the fact that no information had actually been 
disclosed, or access to files permitted to that attorney. 
Central to the court's holding was the fact that no evidence had 
been presented to indicate that the firm in question had in place 
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"specific institutional mechanisms" to block the flow of 
confidential information. Id. at 1101. Undergirding the court's 
opinion was a recognition of the importance of protecting client 
confidentiality and avoiding any appearance of impropriety. Id. 
at 1100. This view was echoed in Bicas v. Superior Court and 
Kahn, 567 P.2d 1198 (Az. App. 1977). In Bicas the court noted 
that an attorney must avoid "not only the fact, but even the 
appearance of representing conflicting interests." Jd. at 1202. 
Against the backdrop of these philosophical underpinnings, firmly 
rooted in our system of justice, the Utah Supreme Court issued 
it's opinion in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Ut. 1992). There, 
the Court held that appointment of a part-time prosecutor as 
defense counsel constituted an inherent conflict of interest and 
warranted a new trial. The Court relied on Utah's criminal code 
requirement that lawyers who defend indigent defendants "assure 
undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client". Id. at 856. 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1(4) (1992)). The Brown Court 
held that because of counsel's part-time prosecutor position 
"defendant's right to the undivided loyalty of counsel was 
jeopardized", id. at 859. The Brown Court held that a case-by-
case inquiry to prove prejudice is "unnecessary and ill-advised" 
Id. To remedy the inherent injustice which occurs in dual 
representation cases, the Utah Supreme Court announced "a per se 
8 
rule of reversal wherever such dual representation is undertaken 
so as to prevent its recurrence." Id. The Brown per se rule 
arose based on the Court's open acknowledgment of the critical 
importance of defense counsel's undivided loyalty to his/her 
client. That loyalty is impermissibly compromised when defense 
counsel maintains an "of counsel" or office sharing 
relationship1 with lawyers who have prosecutorial functions in 
the same county as the public defender and when a senior partner 
oversees the funding of defense counsel's public defender 
contract. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND A CONFLICT 
BASED ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE SHARING OR OF COUNSEL 
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ATTORNEYS WHO PERFORMED 
PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES VIOLATED THE MANDATE OF 
1
 The trial court below in this matter made a specific finding 
that the relationship between Swanson's counsel and the rest of the 
lawyers with whom he shared an office and maintained an "of 
counsel" relationship was in fact a "landlord/tenant" relationship. 
(Tr. March 12, 1993, p. 38, In. 4-6). The court indicated that it 
did not find the description "office sharing" appropriate. (Id. In. 
6-8). Moreover, the court held that the "of counsel" designation 
was "a slippery slope into an abyss of reasoning." (Id. p. 41, In. 
1-3). However, throughout the hearings on the issue of Counsel's 
relationship, he and the other lawyers in the office repeatedly and 
consistently described their relationship as an "office sharing" or 
"of counsel" relationship. It was only after testimony from Utah 
State Bar Counsel Steve Trost stating his view that Counsel's 
relationship did in fact create a conflict, that the trial court 
recharacterized the nature of the relationship as landlord/tenant. 
Regardless of the trial court's characterization, the facts remain 
as set forth in Swanson's brief. Those facts are undisputed and 
led Bar Counsel to reach his conclusion that defense counsel's 
relationship did present an impermissible conflict. The testimony 
of Mr. Trost is more fully discussed below. 
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STATE V. BROWN THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD POSSESS 
UNDIVIDED LOYALTY TO HIS CLIENT, 
In State v. Brown, supra, the Utah Supreme Court found that 
defense counsel's employment as a part time prosecutor in a city 
located in the same county as the pending criminal trial of 
defense counsel's client jeopardized the defendant's right to 
undivided loyalty of counsel. In short, the court made clear 
that where an attorney has prosecutorial responsibilities he or 
she may not be appointed to defend indigent persons. The court 
noted that "to insure faith in the impartiality and integrity of 
the justice system, the appearance of fairness and impartiality 
in the adjudication process must be diligently maintained." Id. 
at 858. The court stated that when counsel has obligations to 
individuals other than his or her client the undivided loyalty to 
which defendants are entitled is compromised. The court referred 
to "unconscious influences" which may affect the vigorous 
advocacy guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. These same concerns 
are present here. Counsel defends cases in the same county as 
attorneys in his office who prosecute cases. Thus, as is often 
the case in rural counties, witnesses, particularly county law 
enforcement officials, will be involved in concurrent cases. 
Relationships or loyalties develop, certain treatment might be 
expected or desired, concerns may exist preventing vigorous or 
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confrontive cross-examination. Add to these factors the 
circumstance where defense counsel is supervised in his duties as 
a public defender by a senior attorney in his office and an 
actual conflict exists. 
The analysis of Brown should extend to "of counsel" and 
"office sharing" relationships. Rule 1.10 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct, admonishes that "[w]hile lawyers are 
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited 
from doing so" Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10. 
(1992). While the comment to Rule 1.10 excludes from the 
definition of "firm" practitioners who share office space and 
occasionally consult or assist each other, the comment makes 
clear that "if they present themselves to the public in a way 
suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, 
they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules." 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10 comment (1992). 
Under the current facts, Swanson's counsel held himself out to 
the public as a member of the "firm" by appearing with other firm 
members in the local phone book, being included on the firm's 
letterhead and sharing the firm's receptionists and support 
staff. Swanson believed he was a member of the firm and visited 
him in the offices of the firm. (Tr. March 5, 1993, p. 24, In. 6-
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19). The fact that counsel characterized his relationship as "of 
counsel" and somehow, therefore immune from a conflicts inquiry 
is specifically rejected by numerous authorities. The American 
Bar Association in Formal Opinion 90-357 opined that the "of 
Counsel" relationship 
clearly means that the lawyer is "associated" 
with each firm with which the lawyer is of 
counsel. In consequence there is attribution 
to the lawyer who is of counsel of all the 
disqualifications of each firm, and, 
correspondingly, attribution from the of 
counsel to each firm, of each of those 
disqualifications. ABA Comm. on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 357 (1990) . 
Formal Opinion 90-357 also stated, "[t]here can be no doubt 
that an of counsel lawyer (or firm) is 'associated in' and has an 
'association with' the firm (or firms) to which the lawyer is of 
counsel". This statement led one pair of commentators to note 
that the application of this opinion applies "for purposes of the 
rules of imputation of disqualification". . ."[i]f one lawyer was 
disqualified from representing a client because of a conflict of 
interest, every partner and associate in the law firm was also 
disqualified." E.G. Wren & B.J. Glasock, The of Counsel 
Agreement—A Guide for Law Firm and Practitioner, ABA Senior 
Lawyers Division (1991). Thus, to state the obvious, given that 
Swanson could not have been represented by the lawyer with 
prosecutorial responsibilities in her defense counsel's office 
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likewise that very counsel should have been precluded from 
representing her based on the imputed disqualification. The 
disqualification grew out of defense counsel's admitted of 
counsel and office sharing relationship with the prosecutor. 
The Utah Bar Ethics Committee has addressed this very 
issue; Utah Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 34 (1976). 
This Bar Ethics opinion which was approved December 30, 1976 
presented the following facts: 
Three attorneys share office space under an office 
sharing agreement, using what appears to be a firm 
name with a single telephone number an address, 
and with the names of each of the three along the 
left margin of the letterhead. The relationship 
is described as "an office-sharing partnership." 
Numbered among the three is a deputy county 
attorney who does criminal prosecutions and 
practices privately, and an attorney who sits 
periodically as municipal pro-tern judge. 
Based on these facts the Bar Ethics Committee found that the 
relationship delineated was "an office-sharing partnership". The 
opinion then set forth all relevant formal opinions and informal 
decisions on which the ultimate conclusion of the ethics 
committee relied. That ultimate conclusion was: "A lawyer may 
not do what his partner, associate or one he shares office space 
with may not do." (A copy of this Ethics Opinion is attached 
hereto as Attachment One.) At the hearing before the trial court 
addressing the conflicts question, Utah State Bar Counsel Steve 
Trost emphasized the continuing validity of Ethics Opinion 34 
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stating "the policy considerations that were the underpinnings 
for this rule are the same today as they were then. And even 
though the Disciplinary Rules have now been displaced by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, nonetheless, the corollary of this 
rule, which is the present-day Rule 1.10, has the same 
underpinnings." (Tr. March 12, 1993, p.18, In. 5-11). (Relevant 
portions of Mr. Trost's testimony on the office-sharing 
relationship involving Swanson's counsel are attached hereto as 
Attachment Two.) 
Similar to counsel in the Brown case, Swanson's counsel did 
not provide undivided loyalty of counsel. Swanson's counsel 
maintained an "of counsel" or office-sharing relationship with a 
firm that, at the time of Swanson's representation, had 
prosecutorial responsibilities in Washington County, and had a 
senior partner who is a Washington County Commissioner with 
supervisory and funding power over both the Washington County 
Prosecutor's office and the Public Defender. As Steve Trost 
testified regarding counsel's office relationship, "where there 
is a defense counsel and a prosecutor in the same office, there 
is the real potential for loyalties to be divided." Id. at p.23 
In. 16-18. "These loyalties can be divided by lack of 
confidentiality through shared files, shared computer systems, 
shared receptionists, shared staff and access to common 
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files...it is a significant problem. And it is particularly 
egregious when you have, as our court has chosen to focus on, a 
serious criminal case." Id. In. 19-25, p.24, In.1-5. 
Clearly, Swanson's defense counsel's relationship violated 
Ethical Opinion 34 and resulted in compromising the undivided 
loyalty which this court sought to so carefully guard in Brown. 
Swanson's counsel, throughout all trial court proceedings in this 
matter described his relationship as one of "of counsel" or 
office sharing. Counsel was listed and pictured in the phone 
book with other members of the firm; counsel was listed on the 
firm's letterhead; in order to obtain access to counsel's office 
an individual had to walk into the firm offices; counsel used the 
firm's receptionists and support staff; counsel used an identical 
phone number; moreover, no evidence was presented to indicate 
that counsel did not have access to common files. The comment to 
rule 1.10 notes that if a lawyer has general access to files "it 
should be inferred that such a lawyer is in fact privy to all 
information about the firm's client. Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 1.10 comment (1992). These facts create exactly the 
type of compromised relationship which results in a crisis of 
confidence in the criminal justice system and in the ability of 
indigent defendant's to receive adequate and untainted 
representation. 
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III. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO SWANSON'S 
CURRENT COUNSEL IS APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF 
WASHINGTON COUNTY'S BREACH OF IT'S 
RESPONSIBILITY TO APPOINT EFFECTIVE 
AND CONFLICT FREE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT 
DEFENDANT'S PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
SECTION 77-32-1. 
Utah Code § 77-32-1 sets forth the minimum standards that a 
county is responsible for following in providing indigent 
defendant's counsel. Section 77-32-1 (4) requires that the 
county "assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel". Subsection 
five of that section requires the county to assure representation 
in the taking of a first appeal of right. Ut. Code Ann. 77-32-1 
(5) (1992). Washington County breached it's duty to supply to 
Swanson loyal counsel. Moreover, when the issue of a conflict 
was raised, testified to and supported by authority, the county 
continued to maintain it's original position that no conflict 
existed. Perhaps most troubling, the trial court assented to 
this position, recharacterizing the relationship of defense 
counsel in order to avoid reaching the obvious conclusion that a 
disqualifying conflict was present. 
Had Mr. Huntsman not assumed Swanson's defense and pursued 
this appeal, the conflicted relationships would have continued. 
Given Washington County's abdication of it's responsibility to 
assure Swanson undivided loyalty which required her, of her own 
volition to seek new counsel, the brunt of financial hardship 
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should not be Mr. Huntsman's to bear. Mr. Huntsman stepped in 
after the county failed to fulfill it's duty and after appointed 
counsel provided services to Swanson under circumstances clearly 
violative of Utah law, the ethical rules and Bar opinion. It is 
unrealistic to expect attorneys concerned about these issues to 
affirmatively seek to rectify breaches of duty absent some 
recompense for their effort. The significant public policy 
interests vindicated by this appeal and necessary after the 
failure of Washington County to fulfill its obligations warrants 
an award of fees to Mr. Huntsman. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment and relevant interpretations thereof by 
the U.S Supreme Court, in addition to the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Brown, promise to criminal defendants the 
right to effective and meaningful assistance of counsel. That 
promise is hollow if appointed counsel is allowed to maintain 
relationships with other lawyers which create a conflict in 
loyalty or compromise the ability or desire of counsel to 
vigorously advocate on behalf of a client. Amicus respectfully 
requests this court to fulfill the promise of the Brown decision 
and assure to all criminal defendant's the impartial advocacy 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article I, § 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. Amicus respectfully requests the Court to extend 
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the Brown analysis and it's per se rule to cases where an 
attorney undertakes representation of indigent defendants while 
maintaining an office-sharing or "of Counsel" relationship with 
attorneys who are prosecutors or who have funding or supervisory 
power over the office of the public defender. Moreover, Amicus 
respectfully requests the court to award to Mr. Huntsman 
attorneys fees expended in representing Swanson at hearing and in 
this appeal. 
Dated this day of December, 1993. 
KATHRYN D. KENDELL 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
UTAH FOUNDATION, INC. 
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Summary: It is improper for lawyers to hold themselves out as 
partners where no partnership relationship exists. 
A lawyer may not do what his partner, associate or one he shares 
office space with may not do. 
An attorney may not appear before a pro-tern judge with whom 
office space is shared and may not appear in any criminal matters in 
that court. 
Facts: Three attorneys share office space under an office 
sharing agreement, using what appears to be a firm name with a single 
telephone number and address, and with the names of each of the three 
along the left margin of your letterhead. You describe the relation-
ship as "an office sharing partnership." 
Numbered among the three is a deputy county attorney who does 
criminal prosecutions and practices privately, and an attorney who 
sits periodically as municipal pro-tern judge. 
The questions you have posed are: 
1. Are the other two attorneys in the office precluded from 
doing criminal work entirely, just as to state prosecutions, just as 
to matters the deputy county attorney may be involved in, or not at 
all? 
2. What, if any, limitation should be placed on the attorney 
serving as a municipal pro tern judge, and what, if any, restrictions 
should there be as to his associates appearing before him as a pro tern 
judge or appearing before that court? 
Your inquiries raise some important preliminary questions which 
must necessarily be explored prior to responding to the specific 
questions you have asked. 
You have indicated in your background information that each of 
you receives income only from your own clients and not from the work 
of any other attorney in the office. 
Opinion: Rule IV, Canon 2, DR 2-102 (C) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct indicates: 
"A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a part-
nership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in 
fact partners." 
The relationship you have delineated in your letter which you 
describe as "an office sharing partnership" is not in fact a partner-
ship but merely an office sharing arrangement. In this regard, 
several ABA Ethics Opinions are pertinent. 
Formal Opinion 106 cited with approval in the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility under DR 2-102(C) passed directly on the 
relationship, holding that it was improper for a group of attorneys to 
hold themselves out as partners where no partnership existed but one 
was the employer of the others named in the firm name. 
Formal Opinion 115 held that two attorneys could not hold them-
selves out as partners when they were, in fact, attorneys in separate 
states using a partnership name in both states and where each was 
responsible for his own office expenses. 
Formal Opinion 126 held that it was improper for lawyers sharing 
office space to hold themselves out as partners under the name A, B 
and C for the purpose of court appearances and signing pleadings when 
in fact they were not partners. 
Formal Opinion 277 held that it was improper for two attorneys in 
different cities to hold themselves out as partners under the name of 
Smith and Jonesf Attorneys at Law, when in fact what they had was a 
referral arrangement only. 
In Informal Decision 555, the question was asked whether two 
attorneys might practice under a firm name where no real partnership 
in fact exists and when they are in reality associates sharing 
expenses* The Committee stated unequivocally: 
"This Committee has stated on numerous occasions that 
it is improper for a group of lawyers to hold themselves out 
as partners when no partnership relation in fact exists." 
(citing the cases enumerated above) 
We think it is incumbent upon the three of you to carefully 
rethink your relationship, since it appears likely that you are 
currently at cross purposes with DR 2-102(F). 
A determination of partnership status is not, however material to 
the questions you have raised, i.e., the interrelation of you as asso-
ciates, having regard to the county prosecutor duties of one associate 
and pro-tern judge status of the other. If you were truly partners, 
you would fall under the interdiction "that which one partner could 
not do precludes all partners from undertaking to do." (ABA Formal 
Opinion 177, Informal Decisions C-493, 674, 691 and 855.) 
The question then is, are persons sharing an office relationship 
in a different position than those who are partners or associates of a 
partnership? Informal Opinion 855 holds that they are not. The 
opinion holds that: 
". . . what a laywer cannot do, neither his partner, 
his associate nor one with whom he shares offices may do." 
This view is reinforced in Informal Opinion 995 where it is held 
that two lawyers who share offices, although not partners, bear such a 
close relation to one another that if one is precluded ethically from 
representing a client then so also is the other* 
With these principles as guidelines, let us examine the 
specifics. This Committee has held in Utah Opinion 26 that a pro-tern 
judge may not appear as criminal defense counsel in the same court, 
stating: 
"Working with criminal court personnel and police, in 
the close circumstances required in the judicial handling of 
criminal matters, has an effect upon those persons which 
would make it difficult for a police officer, for example, 
to regard a pro-tern judge, acting as counsel, as he would 
any other lawyer contending adversely to the case he is pre-
senting to the court. 
We think the appearance of impropriety and the poten-
tial for pressure on police personnel makes it inappropriate 
for an attorney serving as a pro-tern judge in city court 
criminal cases, on a not infrequent basis to also act as 
defense counsel in city court criminal cases." 
The Committee has also held in Utah Opinion 22 that county attor-
neys may not represent criminal defendants in other courts. To the 
same effect is Utah Opinion 16. This interdiction applies equally to 
a deputy. (Utah Opinions 4 and 7.) 
Neither of the remaining two could properly appear before the 
pro-tern judge since he obviously could not do so. None of you may 
appear in municipal court criminal matters since the pro-tern judge 
would be precluded. None of you could properly appear as counsel in 
any civil matter arising out of a criminal matter in which either the 
pro-tern judge or the deputy county prosecutor had involvement. 
It follows, of course, that neither of the remaining two may 
represent the other side in civil litigation where one of you repre-
sents a party to the litigation. 
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partnership relationship as office-sharing? 
A. Well, I would think at least if not more. 
Because in office-sharing, you'd be prohibited from 
indicating or holding yourself out as a member of a firm of 
those other people you're office-sharing with; whereas, if 
it's a true "of counsel" situation, then you could 
generally put yourself on the letterhead and — and 
indicate you're of counsel. 
Q. Okay, Could you have computers that interface? 
A. Sure. 
Q. And share secretaries with confidences and those 
things? 
A. Well, again, it's a unique situation depending 
on the association. But — but generally that's true. 
Q. So in light of that situation, would it be — 
let me give you a hypothetical and ask you — 
THE COURT: Counsel, you don't have to be 
hypothetical. The rules don't require it. Lay out the 
facts that we've got. Let's hear Mr. Trost's opinion. 
MR. HUNTSMAN: All right. Well, that's — 
Q. If there were a situation — let me give you the 
situation that we have here with the firm of Gallian, 
Westfall & Wilcox. 
A. I'm sorry? I didn't hear that. 
Q. Okay. We have a firm called Gallian, Westfall & 
T J A T T T r* TV/T^iT»^TTTT T T\T 
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Wilcox. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Now, the only facts we have before this court 
are these. Although lately I've been aware of additional 
facts. But let me just give you these. 
The firm includes an associate named John 
Hummel, who prosecute — who does prosecutorial work for 
the city of Ivins. Senior partner Russ Gallian is the city 
attorney for the city of Ivins. Also a county commissioner 
with budgetary and other powers and influence in regulation 
of among other things the public defender's office, 
prosecutor's office, sheriff, jail, and those things. And 
we have with that firm — now, taking it with only those 
facts — two other attorneys, MacArthur Wright and his son 
Jonathan Wright, who hold themselves out as "of counsel" in 
some publications, at least. And in this situation, as I 
understand the facts, the only door designation, if you 
were to walk into the office, says "Gallian, Westfall & 
Wilcox." Nothing about Mr. Wright. They share "cne same 
stationery; have computers that interface. Mr. Wright has 
a half-time secretary. The other half of the time, she 
does work for the Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox firm and is 
privy to their confidences. They share the same phone — 
telephone number and are on stationery together, although 
current stationery — and I believe — well, the stationery 
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1 at least at all relevant times here does suggest — does 
2 indicate an "of counsel" relationship. 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, I'm going to hand to 
4 Mr. Trost — if you don't have a problem — Exhibit No. 2, 
5 the stationery; Exhibit No. 1, the telephone ad that 
6 doesn't show "of counsel"; and Exhibit No. 3, the telephone 
7 ad that does show. 
8 Do you want him to look at those? 
9 MR. HUNTSMAN: Yes, sir. 
10 THE COURT: Let's let him see them. 
11 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
12 Q. BY MR. HUNTSMAN: Now, with that in — in mindf 
13 and based on your understanding of DR 1.10 and of published 
14 Opinion No. 34 and the other laws and regulations that are 
15 applicable, would you say that it would be proper and 
16 appropriate for Mr. Wright to do public defender work in 
17 Utah for a political subdivision of the state if 
18 Mr. Gallian or Mr. Hummel could not? 
19 A. My opinion would be that it would not be 
20 proper. That it would be a violation of Rule 110. If 
21 you'd like me to tell you why, I would. 
22 Q. Yes. Yes. Would you, please. 
23 A. There's two concerns• One is dealing with the 
24 indicia of a firm which would appear to have and which 
25 would be consistent and prohibitive under 1.10 in the — 
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the prior rules based upon what's — what's in the 
photograph in the yellow pages and the letterhead 
indicating "of counsel." 
The second and — and probably more compelling 
reason is the — the public policy reason behind all the 
conflict Rules. 1.7, prohibiting conflicts between current 
clients; 1.8, prohibitive transaction with clients; 1.9, 
prohibitive conflicts between a current client or a former 
client; and 1.10, the imputed disqualification of loyalty. 
And it's — it's an undivided, unfettered type of loyalty 
that the attorney must demonstrate and show to his client. 
The courts that have commented on this, and the 
commentators that have commented on this have all 
universally felt that — and, of course, our court has felt 
this as — as exhibited in Brown — very — very strongly 
stated this, that where there is a defense counsel and a 
prosecutor in the same office, there is the real potential 
for loyalties to be divided. 
Those loyalties can be divided due to a number 
of circumstances. The confidences of the client can be 
compromised because of the access to the files — to common 
files — unless there's evidence that they are secure. The 
confidences in terms of phone messages and sharing staff 
and staff being aware of — of the different positions of 
the — of the State and the — or excuse me — of the 
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prosecution and the defense is a very real problem. So 
there's — it's — it's more than just an appearance or — 
or an illusory problem. It is a — a significant problem. 
And it is particularly egregious when you have, as our 
court has chosen to focus on a — a serious criminal case. 
Q. So there might be a tendency for a — let's say 
a public defender to not want to offend someone who works 
with budgets or with sheriff's deputies — 
A. Right. 
Q. — who might he be cross-examining? That sort 
of thing? 
A. That's right. 
Q. All right. 
A. It may even be a subconscious type of thing. 
You know, he may not feel that he wants to as aggressively 
cross-examine his partner's witness as if he would a — 
some other lawyer's witness. 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you this, Mr. Trost. And I 
appreciate your comment on that. 
Are you aware of the — the reasons why in the 
Brown case the Supreme Court determined that cases should 
not necessarily have to be heard on an individual fact 
basis? That there's a per se rule of reversal. Is there 
any reason particularly for that? Aren't — aren't cases 
sometimes really different? 
